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INTRODUCTION 
In Law’s Quandary,1 Steven Smith focuses our attention on what legal 
discourse and legal practices seem simultaneously to suggest and to 
deny.  He argues that our words and actions in this area assume a 
transcendent law with a divine author, a view that, he asserts, once 
dominated classical thinking about law, but which we now purport to 
reject.  Smith further argues that the senselessness of much of our 
judicial and scholarly writing about law is due to this disconnect, or 
∗ Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota.  A 
version of this paper was presented at “Law’s Quandary: A Discussion,” a Roundtable 
held at the University of Notre Dame Law School in March of 2006.  I am grateful for 
the comments and suggestions received there.  Also, as a matter of full disclosure, I am 
acknowledged in the Preface of Law’s Quandary because I read an early draft and 
offered some comments.  SMITH, infra note 1, at xiii.  I also make two brief and unimportant 
cameo appearances in the argument.  Id. at 3, 168.
1.    STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
  




“gap,” between the “ontology” that our legal practices presuppose and 
the contrary, thinner metaphysical views we proclaim.2
This paper will explore a few central aspects of Smith’s fascinating 
and provocative argument.  Part I considers the connection between Smith’s 
analysis and one standard Wittgensteinian argument about the causes of 
philosophical problems.  Part II, starting from a different direction, explores 
the “classical” approach to law that Smith extols as superior to our own, 
raises some questions about Smith’s portrayal, and considers the extent 
to which his approach can provide better answers to the quandaries 
Smith discusses than does conventional modern legal thought. 
I.  ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTION 
In the first chapter of his book, The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart 
explores the fact that the question “What is law?” had become central to 
jurisprudential discussions, and the unusual responses and theoretical 
positions that this question seems to have provoked.3  Following a roughly 
Wittgensteinian method of doing philosophy,4 Hart notes the strangeness 
of the question, the even stranger answers it seems to provoke, and 
suggests that we focus instead on the underlying concerns that motivate 
the inquiry.5
Smith begins his book by avoiding Hart’s path away from the basic 
question of “what is law?”  Smith invokes a fictional character asking 
lawyers to show her “the law,” and she objects when all she is shown are 
examples of legal texts and legal practices.6
Smith is well aware of the dangers here—that it may be a “category 
mistake” to ask to see, for example, “the university,” “the division,” or 
“team spirit” separate from their instantiations—and some might urge 
that Smith’s fictional interlocutor makes a similar mistake.7  However, 
Smith notes that there are other occasions where asking these sorts of 
        2.     See generally id.  
 3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1-17 (2d ed. 1994).  Likely, I have a bias 
in discussing Smith’s book.  After all, my work tends to be—or, more modestly and 
precisely, aspires to be—among the works that Smith dismissively rejects as the 
“meticulously ponderous successors” of Hart’s work.  SMITH, supra note 1, at xi. 
 4. On the connection between Wittgenstein’s method and Hart’s analysis, see 
Brian Bix, Questions in Legal Interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 137 (Andrei 
Marmor ed., 1995). 
 5. Smith, citing me, notes this tendency in Hart’s work.  SMITH, supra note 1, at 
3.  Hart suggests that the concerns underlying the question “What is law?” are: “How 
does law differ from and how is it related to orders backed by threats?  How does legal 
obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral obligation?  What are rules and to 
what extent is law an affair of rules?”  HART, supra note 3, at 13. 
 6. SMITH, supra note 1, at 41. 
 7. Id. at 42. 
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question may not be a category error: for example, with “romantic love,” 
one can speak of its existence and identity separate from its manifestations.8  
And as Smith rightly observes,9 Plato’s dialogues often involve Socrates 
challenging people to give definitions of key terms that go beyond 
pointing to their instantiations. 
Nonetheless, on its own, searching for “the law” seems like the sort of 
error Wittgenstein warns us against: being misled by grammar, in particular, 
by assuming that nouns must refer to some object.10  The Hartian version 
of Wittgenstein’s response still seems appropriate: that we would be 
well-advised to focus instead on the underlying concerns that would 
motivate such a strange question, rather than seek definitions or metaphysical 
responses. 
To be fair, Smith’s inquiry is justified by more than the mere grammar 
of “the law.”11  He discusses certain “quandaries” in our legal practices 
and shows how certain practices seem to assume a transcendent law: for 
example, the treatment of common law decisions as “evidence of . . . the 
law[]” rather than law itself;12 the retroactive application of judicial 
 8. Id. at 43. 
 9. Id. at 17-19. 
 10. See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, THE BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS 1 (2d. ed. 1960).    
The context of that quote is as follows: 
What is the meaning of a word? 
    Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the 
meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like? 
    The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question “how do 
we measure a length?” helps us to understand the problem “what is length?” 
    The questions “What is length?,” “What is meaning?,” “What is the number 
one?,” et cetera, produce in us a mental cramp.  We feel that we can’t point to 
anything in reply to them and yet ought to point to something.  (We are up 
against one of the great sources of philosophical bewilderment: a substantive 
makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it.) 
Id. 
 11. And one cannot as easily “translate” into ontologically simple terms “the law 
says that X” as compared with, for example, “the White House today proclaimed . . .” or 
“IBM today purchased . . . .” 
 12. Smith cites famous language from Justice Story in Swift v. Tyson.  SMITH, 
supra note 1, at 46.  It is important to understand the passage in its full context.  Justice 
Story writes: 
In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that the decisions of 
Courts constitute laws.  They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, 
and are not of themselves laws.  They are often re-examined, reversed, and 
qualified by the Courts themselves, whenever they are found to be either 
defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).  First, it is important to understand that 
Justice Story makes this claim as part of a conclusion that the Judiciary Act of 1789, 




decisions, even when they deal with issues of first impression or are 
decisions that seem to mark a significant change in the prior law; and the 
search for “the meaning” of statutes and constitutional provisions, even 
in situations where “plain meaning” and legislative history give little 
guidance.13  And there are basic questions about the sense of legal 
propositions—what it is that makes them true or false—that may or may 
not require a richer ontological grounding than most of us profess or in 
which most of us believe.14
Yet one still leaves with the suspicion that Smith seeks quandaries 
where they may not exist.  Again, in a Wittgensteinian vein, one might 
respond that our current practices work well on their own terms and 
require no further explanation.15  Our current practices, and the continuing 
debates surrounding those practices,16 do not seem either irrational or 
paradoxical—though they remain controversial and subject to arguments 
for reform—if we accept two ideas: (1) it is the task of officials to 
resolve disputes consistently with past official actions—statutes, constitutional 
provisions, and prior judicial resolutions of disputes; and (2) that our 
legal system and its officials should have the objectives of coherence, 
reason, or justice, with whatever ontological commitments these objectives 
bring.17  There is, of course, room to argue about the fairest way to deal 
which requires federal courts to apply “the laws of the several states,” does not require 
those courts to follow state court common law decisions, as contrasted with state 
statutory law.  See id. at 18-19.  Second, Story’s description of how common law 
decisionmaking differs from statutory law seems, on its own, to be unexceptionable.  Of 
course, the question remains of what is going on in common law decisionmaking, and 
whether it entails belief in “transcendent” law; it will be revisited, if briefly, below. 
 13. E.g., SMITH, supra note 1, at 39-64. 
 14. Ronald Dworkin asserts the question as the basic one of the nature of legal 
sense: what it is that makes propositions about law, or within it, true or false.  See, e.g., 
Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 527 (1982).  However, as 
Smith observes, SMITH, supra note 1, at 167, 200 n.37, Dworkin’s own work rejects the 
need for significant ontological grounding.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and 
Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996). 
 15. A similar line of argument is offered, expertly and in greater detail, in Lloyd L. 
Weinreb, Law’s Quest for Objectivity, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 711 (2006).  For example, 
consider the following: 
How, [Smith] asks, can we possibly know what the law is . . . .  The 
uncomplicated, sensible answer is that we ascertain what the law is by doing 
all the things that lawyers and judges do: parsing a statute, reading judicial 
opinions, perhaps studying a treatise.  Having done all that conscientiously, we 
are in a position to say what the law is.  Why is that not enough? 
Id. at 715. 
 16. These include, for example, ongoing disputes regarding horizontal precedent, 
the reference to legislative history in statutory interpretation, the proper approach to 
constitutional interpretation, et cetera. 
 17. Smith makes much of that most legal academic writing is silly or obscure and 
the fact that the discourse of lawyers and judges has its own faults.  SMITH, supra note 1, 
at 6-8.  The plagues of academic writing on one hand and professional discourse on the 
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with situations where the application of past judicial decisions or statutory 
language is unclear, both how to clarify ambiguous provisions18 and 
when to make applications prospective only, but these are normative 
(moral, policy) debates that do not necessarily entail significant metaphysical/ 
ontological grounding.19  It is certainly open to Smith to argue that our 
current practices of statutory interpretation or common law decisionmaking 
are irrational or illegitimate.20   
II.  THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF LAW 
In contrast to our ontologically starved and legally confused modern 
times, Smith extols what he calls the “classical” response, which he 
associates primarily with the portrayal of law by Thomas Aquinas (circa 
1225-1274), but which, he argues, continued through the common law 
other are well-known, but are usually not seen to have been caused by ontological gaps 
or to require metaphysical cures; I would not mind, however, seeing Smith’s sharp 
analytical mind let loose on English departments or business managerial jargon. 
 18. As Smith states, the courts would always have the option to simply state that 
there is no law on this subject, so some default applies—defendant wins in lawsuit, there 
is no criminal prohibition, et cetera.  Id. at 150.  However, while this may be a workable 
response for some circumstances—Justice Scalia expressed particular enthusiasm for it 
with constitutional provisions, see Antonin Scalia, Law & Language, 157 FIRST THINGS 
37, 44 (2005) (reviewing LAW’S QUANDARY)—it can never be a complete answer.  
Vague borderlines themselves have vague borderlines: even assuming a presumption of 
liberty or an interpretive theory of lenity, the legal system would still have to apply 
decisions and legal language in circumstances of less than full clarity.  See JOSEPH RAZ, 
Legal Reasons, Sources, and Gaps, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 73 (1979) (discussing the 
inevitability of “legal gaps”). 
 19. Cf. Weinreb, supra note 15, at 715 (“The gap that Professor Smith perceives is 
not ontological—the universe is not missing some furniture that ought to be there—but 
normative.  It is a gap between the law’s normative demands and its perceived lack of 
rational force.”). 
 20. It is important to recall that much of Dworkin’s philosophical machinery in his 
theory of law is justified by just such concerns: that judicial decisions be, and be seen as 
being, based on past official actions rather than the retroactive application of newly 
legislated standards.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-15 
(1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, RIGHTS] (discussing “embarrassing questions” that sound 
similar to some of Smith’s “quandaries”). 
  Also, while it is true that judges and lawyers act as if there were answers to 
questions not yet resolved by social sources, it is important to recall that it is not only 
law, and thus, not only areas of discourse with theological and ontologically rich 
traditions, where this is the case.  As Dworkin has pointed out, we often speak as if and 
seem sincerely to believe that there are correct answers regarding aspects of the life and 
personality of fictional characters, whether from books, films, or television shows, 
beyond what is displayed in their tales.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 149 (1985). 




views of later English jurists.  Smith summarizes his understanding of 
the classical view as follows: 
Law’s ultimate author was God, whose providential plan for the cosmos 
constituted what Aquinas described as an “eternal law,” and all law—human 
and divine—derived its legal character from that law.  But what we would call 
“positive law” comes into being only as it is promulgated by human legislators.  
Moreover, very little of the detailed content of positive law can be “read off” of 
the eternal law; the content is given, rather, by the decisions of human legislators.  
So those mundane authors supply the substance of the law that serves, for 
example, the function of coordination.  But the law is also connected to a higher 
or deeper source of meaning through its underlying, divine authorship.21
I want to look at Aquinas’s view at somewhat greater length than 
Smith did.  A key passage in Aquinas, cited and discussed briefly by 
Smith,22 states: 
Hence every human positive law has the nature of law to the extent that it is 
derived from the Natural Law.  If, however, in some point it conflicts with the 
law of nature it will no longer be law but rather a perversion of law. . . . 
However, it should be noted that there are two ways in which something can be 
derived from the Natural Law.  The first way is as conclusions are derived from 
principles.  The second way is through determination of certain generalities. . . .  
  . . . . 
. . . [B]oth are found in human Positive Law.  But those things that are 
contained in human law, not as arising exclusively therefrom, have some force 
from the Natural Law as well.  But those that are derived from the Natural Law 
in the second way have force exclusively from human laws.23
Aquinas later adds: “Positive human laws are either just or unjust.  If 
they are just, they have the power of binding in conscience, a power 
which comes from the Eternal Law from which they are derived . . . .”24  
Aquinas concludes that, to unjust laws, “the order of power divinely 
conferred does not extend.  Hence, in such matters, man is not bound to 
obey the law, if it can be resisted without scandal or greater harm.”25
Without in any way denying or discounting the perspective of people 
who are comfortable with references to “Eternal Law” and “Natural 
Law,”26 it is my opinion that these views can be, for our purposes, 
 21. SMITH, supra note 1, at 152. 
 22. Id. at 46, 185. 
 23. SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW 288 (R. J. Henle ed. & trans., 
1993) (Q. 95, Art. 2, corpus). 
 24. Id. at 324.  For Aquinas, a law is just if it is “ordered to the Common Good,” 
does not exceed the lawmaker’s authority, and imposes burdens in a proportionate way 
across the community.  Id. at 325 (Q. 96, Art. 4, corpus). 
 25. Id. at 323 (Q. 96, Art. 4, Reply 3). 
 26. Aquinas discussed the relationship between the Eternal Law and the Natural 
Law as follows: “The Natural Law is nothing other than a participation in the Eternal 
Law by the rational creature.”  Id. at 160 (Q. 91, Art. 2, corpus); see also JOHN FINNIS, 
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translated into an idiom in which modern and secular readers will be 
more familiar: 
(1) There are objective moral truths, which some may call the 
“Natural Law”; 
(2) Law should be consistent with moral truth; the moral principles 
may sometimes leave only one possible legal rule, but on other 
occasions may allow a selection among equally legitimate 
legal rules; 
(3) Legal rules that are consistent with morality create moral 
obligations, or “bind in conscience”; those that are contrary to 
morality do not create moral obligations, though there may be 
an obligation on occasion to outwardly comply in order not to 
undermine a generally just legal system. 
What are the problems of this “translation”?  It certainly would not pick 
up a view Smith ascribes to some of the English jurists, that “Christianity 
was part of the common law.”27  However, to the extent that this claim 
was meant to be taken as more than metaphorical, and to the extent that 
the claim means something more than that the common law incorporates 
general moral values affirmed by Christianity (and most other major 
religions and secular ethical systems), such as “murder is bad,” et cetera, 
this claim seems broadly and clearly untenable.  Consider just a few 
standard tenets of English common law and see how well they fit with 
Christian religious or moral teaching: the absence of any affirmative 
duty to rescue, even when the rescue could be done with minimal risk to 
the potential rescuer;28 the exemption of wives from the protection of rape 
laws;29 the unenforceability of promises unsupported by consideration;30 
and so on. 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 388-403 (1980) (discussing the relationship between 
Eternal Law and Natural Law).  I should note that Patrick McKinley Brennan has offered 
a distinctly different reading of Aquinas on the Eternal Law in Law, Natural Law, and 
Human Intelligence: Living the Correlation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 731, 741-43 (2006). 
 27. SMITH, supra note 1, at 47. 
 28. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 
(1980) (arguing against the current and long-established general common law principle 
of no duty to rescue). 
 29. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital 
Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1373 (2000). 
 30. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.5, at 53-54 (4th ed. 2004).  
As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court wrote in the well-known case of Mills v. 
Wyman, in rejecting the argument that moral consideration would be sufficient to make a 




Even Aquinas asserted the clear divergence between the content of 
law—descriptive or prescriptive—and the content of Christian teaching: 
   Now, human law is framed for the whole community of men in which most 
men are not perfect in virtue.  And therefore human law does not prohibit all 
vices from which the virtuous abstain but only the more serious ones from 
which it is possible for the majority to abstain and especially those which are 
harmful to others and which, if not prohibited, would make the preservation of 
human society impossible: Thus human law prohibits murders, thefts, and the 
like.31
To return to the proffered “translation,” the translated text would seem 
neither especially controversial32 nor necessarily to entail significant 
ontological commitments.33
Smith equates the classical view with an approach that equated “the 
law” with divine legislation.  However, it is important to understand that 
there was always a tension within the Natural Law tradition between 
those who equated the Natural Law, or moral truth, with the will or 
command of God, and those who believed that the Natural Law was in 
principle independent of divine will, reflecting instead a rationally accessible 
order.  Reaching back to the terms of Plato’s dialogue “Euthyphro,”34 
slightly modified in paraphrase, the question is whether something is 
good because and only because it is chosen by God, or is chosen by God 
because it is good, and thus its goodness can in principle be determined 
without reference to divine choice.35  The view that emphasized divine 
will or command is known as voluntarism; the opposite view has gone 
promise enforceable, law quite consciously deviated from the standards set by (religious) 
morality: 
A deliberate promise, in writing, made freely and without any mistake . . . 
cannot be broken without a violation of moral duty.  But if there was nothing 
paid or promised for it, the law, perhaps wisely, leaves the execution of it to 
the conscience of him who makes it. 
Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207, 211 (1825). 
 31. AQUINAS, supra note 23, at 316 (Q. 96, Art. 2, corpus). 
 32. Though, of course, not everyone would agree with every detail of those 
propositions.  For example, some prominent theorists doubt that legal rules, even when 
consistent with moral truth, always or necessarily create a moral obligation to obey.  See, 
e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition, in ETHICS IN THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN 325 (1994) (arguing against a general moral obligation to obey the law). 
 33. The metaphysical and ontological grounding needed for moral systems is, of 
course, itself a highly controversial topic within moral philosophy and theology, and one 
need only note that many prominent moral systems are not grounded on divine command 
or otherwise dependent upon or entail the existence of God. 
 34. PLATO, Euthyphro, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 178 (Edith 
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Lane Cooper trans., 1961). 
 35. For the purpose of these alternatives, one might accept that the Good does not 
have that quality simply because it is chosen by God, and that the Good is in principle 
identifiable even without reference to divine command, but still believe that divine 
command is significant on the basis that God is a more reliable, less fallible guide to 
finding the Good than are human reasoning and judgment. 
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under a number of labels, including intellectualism and rationalism.36  
The simple point here is that not everyone in classical times equated 
Natural Law, or any other version of the “higher law,” simply with 
divine will or command.37
One should probably not make too much of this clarification.  After 
all, if one accepts objective moral truth—perhaps related to a normatively 
charged world, even if not simply equated with a divine plan or a series 
of divine commands—and the idea that positive human law is “a 
participation in” or an aspiration towards that moral truth, this may serve 
the purposes of Smith’s argument at least as well as any voluntarist 
Natural Law view.  We need to separate out two claims: 
(1) that there are, or that we think or assume that there are, legal 
rules—or at least the answers to some legal disputes—that are 
already present prior to any official action regarding those 
disputes; and 
(2) that this preexisting law is some divine command, promulgation, 
or plan. 
We also need to consider the consequences of accepting either or both 
of the above propositions.  Smith spends so much time questioning current 
practices—always asking the right questions and in the most incisive 
way—that he leaves himself little time to consider whether his alternative 
view, the classical view, characterizes and explains our practices any 
better than the conventional views.  To the extent that he considers the 
question, Smith is surprisingly cautious and careful to hedge: belief in 
the classical account “might” help fill the gaps in our legal discourse and 
practice, but, he quickly adds, “from our vantage point it is hard to say.”38
Nevertheless, Law’s Quandary clearly leaves readers with strong hints 
that a return to classical ontology and religious thinking will both 
explain and ground our practices and our discourse, even if the book 
 36. See, e.g., J. B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY 17-36 (1998); 
Mark C. Murphy, Theological Voluntarism, in STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2002), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2002/entries/voluntarism-theological (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2007). 
 37. And this, of course, remains true also for modern writers within the Natural 
Law tradition.  See, e.g., John Finnis, On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1597, 1598-1600 (2000) (criticizing voluntarism in the Natural Law 
tradition). 
 38. SMITH, supra note 1, at 155; see also id. at 99. 




never gets past insinuation.39  Perhaps it is for the next book.40  However, if 
a turn to the classical view would provide less of a solution than the 
book insinuates, this might bring a different light to the “quandaries” 
Smith presents. 
For example, say that one believes that: (1) there is Eternal Law and 
Natural Law; (2) positive law is only law, or “law in its fullest sense,”41 
to the extent that it derives from and is consistent with the Eternal Law 
and Natural Law; and (3) that, as Aquinas, Finnis, and others argued, the 
creation of positive law may also involve determinatio,42 that is, making 
general principles more precise or choosing among equally legitimate 
alternatives.  One might ask, in what way would this picture solve the 
problem of, say, the rhetoric of judges discovering, rather than creating, 
the law,43 or the retroactive application of legal decisions?44  If some of 
those decisions are determinationes, and many likely are, then under 
Smith’s system these decisions do not reflect law that was “already in 
existence.”45
And what of the problem with statutes?  Would a classical view of law 
help justify the courts who tell us that they have discovered, for 
example, what the Sherman Act “really means” regarding some difficult 
and highly contested question of antitrust law?46  If we thought that the 
statute aspired towards some moral ideal or divine code,47 judges might 
use that ideal or code to fill the gaps in the law and clarify its 
uncertainties.  Note, though, that, as earlier suggested, one might easily 
have the same approach to judging without making significant metaphysical/ 
ontological commitments. 
 39. Cf. Scalia, supra note 18, at 45-46 (noting Smith’s strong hints regarding a 
religious answer, but his seeming hesitation to advocate it). 
 40. One is reminded of another prominent theorist who called upon a divine 
response to solve problems his theory raised.  See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 295 (1975) (“Speak, God.”). 
 41. See FINNIS, supra note 26, at 363-66. 
 42. On determinatio, see id. at 284-89; JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 266-74 (1998). 
 43. SMITH, supra note 1, at 56-58. 
 44. Id. at 61-62. 
 45. Instead, we might be pushed in the direction of Ronald Dworkin’s work; 
Dworkin has, throughout his writings, tried to show why judicial decisions are and 
should be based on preexisting right answers to legal disputes.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, 
RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 119-45.  And, of course, he does it with little to no 
metaphysical or ontological machinery.  See, e.g., Dworkin, supra note 14, at 99-105 
(deflecting metaphysics-based objections to the idea of objective moral truth). 
 46. SMITH, supra note 1, at 148. 
 47. Smith is careful to deny, and not to ascribe to other thinkers, the view “that 
there is, say, a sort of ghostly Internal Revenue Code in all of its magnificent detail 
written in the heavens, and that the Code we find in our more terrestrial tax volumes is 
merely a mundane photocopy of the celestial original.”  Id. at 47. 
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However, if one’s considered opinion was that the statute in fact was 
either a determinatio or an action inconsistent with the Natural Law, it is 
far from obvious how belief in Natural Law would support the task of 
determining “what the statute really means.”  Though in the second case, 
involving an unjust law, belief in Natural Law, or another system 
grounding objective moral truths, might guide the judges for the 
different, but still difficult, practical question of what they should do in 
the face of an unjust law.48
What of the various paradoxes of precedent?  Michael Moore has 
shown how belief in metaphysical realism might alter somewhat our 
view of what judges are doing and should be doing in common law 
decisionmaking.49  As Moore points out, a grounding in some form of 
metaphysical realism resolves some apparent paradoxes of precedent and 
common law reasoning, without resolving all of them.50  Under this 
approach, prior case law would be seen as attempts to pick out the 
correct moral kind for each set of facts; any particular decision could 
thus be seen as “evidence of the law” rather than the law itself, in the 
sense that the law is aspiring to the moral truth.51  However, Moore 
concedes that courts would sometimes have to deviate from what 
morality requires in recognition of the institutional fact that other judges, 
perhaps higher in the judicial hierarchy, may have decided disputes in 
the same category differently—that is, wrongly.52  The basic tensions 
between “getting it right” and institutional/hierarchical discipline, and 
between optimal decisions in the present case versus the optimal rule for 
future cases,53 seem intrinsic to the process.54  And this still leaves 
 48. See, e.g., FINNIS, supra note 26, at 351-68 (discussing a Natural Law response 
to unjust laws for citizens and judges). 
 49. See Michael S. Moore, Precedent, Induction, and Ethical Generalization, in 
PRECEDENT IN LAW 183 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987). 
 50. Id. at 196-210. 
 51. Id. at 208-10. 
 52. Id. at 210 (“[S]ome very important bits of institutional history . . . may divert 
the common law considerably from what would be morally ideal.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 588-91 (1987) 
(discussing the suboptimal decisionmaking for individual cases entailed by precedential 
decisionmaking). 
 54. However, these conflicting goals and values do not necessarily mean that 
precedential decisionmaking is inferior to codification; there is much to be said for the 
relative flexibility of precedent.  See generally id.  That, though, is an argument for 
another day. 




untouched the problem of retroactive elements in the application of 
judicial decisions. 
CONCLUSION 
Law’s Quandary is that wonderful and rare combination in modern 
legal scholarship: a book that is simultaneously fresh, clearly written, 
thoughtful, incisive, and mercifully short.  So it is perhaps both unwise 
and unfair of me to wish that it had been longer.55  At the same time, the 
text, in its current short form, leaves the reader frustrated by hinting at 
an answer to the quandaries raised without fully articulating that answer, 
and by leaving at least this reader with the suspicion that the implied 
answer might not resolve the quandaries.  If the last is true, we are left 
with dissolving the quandaries, as I suggest in Part I, or seeking a 
completely different source for our response to the problems of law. 
 
 55. Though, as an author of articles and books myself, I know how rare it is for a 
reader to ask for an academic work to be longer. 
